VERIAL: Verification-Enabled Runtime Integrity Attestation of Linux
Student Name:
Michael Neises
Defense Date:
Location:
Nichols Hall, Room 246 (Executive Conference Room)
Chair:
Perry Alexander
Drew Davidson
Cuncong Zhong
Matthew Moore
Michael Murray
Abstract:
Runtime attestation is a way to gain confidence in the current state of a remote target.
Layered attestation is a way of extending that confidence from one component to another.
Introspective solutions for layered attestation require strict isolation.
The seL4 is uniquely well-suited to offer kernel properties sufficient to achieve such isolation.
I design, implement, and evaluate introspective measurements and the layered runtime attestation of a Linux kernel hosted by the seL4.
VERIAL can detect diamorphine-style rootkits with performance cost comparable to previous work.
Degree:
PhD Dissertation Defense (CS)
Degree Type:
PhD Dissertation Defense
Degree Field:
Computer Science